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Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality, by David Baggett and Jerry 
L. Walls. Oxford University Press, 2011. 283 pages. $99.00 (cloth), $24.95 
(paper).
DAVID O’HARA, Augustana College
David Baggett and Jerry Walls announce that this is to be both an aca-
demic book and one intended for a general audience, and that its aims 
will be to show that moral considerations lead us to believe in God, and 
to defend a certain kind of theistic worldview and theistic ethics. On the 
whole, it’s a good book, and I recommend it.
The authors are Anselmians and Arminians, and they have strong sym-
pathies with C. S. Lewis, Plantinga and the later MacIntyre. They believe in 
divine command theory of a sort that avoids the problems of Ockhamistic 
voluntarism by identifying God with the good. They hold that morality 
points to God, and that God makes sense of morality. Their hope is to de-
fend these views and so to move us beyond the question of whether or not 
God exists to the issue of how to become personally more acquainted with 
the character and goodness of God. “Morality, ultimately, for the Christian, 
is all about relationship, first and foremost with God, and then secondarily 
with others” (186).
These are big things to write about with both clarity and precision for 
a general audience. Bearing that in mind, the biggest flaw in the book 
is quite understandable: the tone and accessibility of the book is not 
consistent. Their voice changes, and often they write in the language of 
the guild, shifting away from the kind of lucidity that otherwise would 
appeal to a general audience. Also, at first blush, some of the problems 
they address may not be appealing to a general audience. For instance, 
one chapter is dedicated to advancing their version of Arminianism over 
against other Reformed views. They write that “both Calvin and Luther 
wished to say that God’s will trumps. This was a crucial mistake because 
philosophically it’s indefensible” (75). For some readers, that kind of claim 
and its defense will no doubt be extremely interesting, and it does serve 
the aims of the book by helping to explain their view of God’s goodness. 
But this chapter may seem irrelevant or even distasteful to those outside 
the Calvin/Arminius debate, as when they open the condescending rhe-
torical spigots for sentences like these: “Calvinists insist on defining sov-
ereignty as all-encompassing divine determinism; anything less than his 
micromanagerial and meticulous providence is unworthy of the greatness 
of his sovereign power. . . .Loving God with all of one’s mind demands a 
more credible theology than Calvinism can offer” (78–79).
Still, a slower reading shows that it is often the case that they accom-
plish broad goals while intending to attack narrow problems. This appar-
ently narrow Calvin/Arminius debate serves the more general purpose 
of arguing that philosophy does indeed have a role to play in thinking 
about the goodness of God. There is also a second benefit to this debate: 
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their discussion of the philosophical problems of compatibilism may be 
directed towards Calvinists, but they subtly suggest that it applies equally 
to those naturalists who, as compatibilists, see no problem with affirming 
both materialist determinism and freedom, or to those who attempt to 
resolve the problem by hand-waving and misdirecting euphemisms.
Baggett and Walls often prove to be broad and generous readers of their 
adversaries. For example, Dawkins claims that the God of the Bible com-
mits and commands so many atrocities that God cannot be morally good. 
Baggett and Walls respond with sympathy: Dawkins, they urge, correctly 
perceives that “character is key.” His error lies not in his first principles, 
but in his method: he misunderstands the character of God by poor sam-
pling of the data, “as if a perusal of the periphery yields more insight than 
an examination of the core” of God’s character. The issue is not acqui-
escence to an existential proposition but the work of gaining familiarity 
with that which exists: “If God is real, then we must strive not for mere 
propositional knowledge or justified belief that God exists but a personal 
acquaintance with the God who does exist” (50).
And there is the crux of the book. The whole book is a modern attempt 
to solve a version of the Euthyphro problem. The solution is not found 
merely theoretically, at the periphery. Rather, by coming to know God, 
and what God is like, we will come to see its solution. Knowledge of God 
will mean knowing the basis on which moral obligations rest. Baggett and 
Walls insist that we need to know more than the social dimension of moral 
obligations, that in addition to epistemic understanding of the social func-
tion of the good we need an ontological understanding of it as well. That 
ontological knowledge boils down (at the risk of oversimplifying) to the 
identity of God and of the good, so that “God is good” is both predica-
tion and identity (126). So the two aims of the book (defending theistic 
ethics and showing that moral considerations lead to theism) are difficult 
to separate from one another. Their view is that because God is identi-
cal with the good, God cannot command us to do what is not good. This 
overcomes the “Ockhamistic” (read: voluntaristic) problem that may be 
entailed by divine command theory.
Of course, there are still problems with this view. They attempt to 
clarify their position by insisting that “what God can’t do is anything in 
diametric opposition, irremediable tension, or patent conflict with our 
most nonnegotiable moral commitments.” That sounds strong, but I don’t 
think it solves more problems than it creates. If we were attempting to get 
away from postmodern moral relativism by appealing to God, this seems 
to make our moral imagination a limit on God’s action and identity. But it 
is not clear how such an appeal to our moral sentiments avoids the post-
modern problem. They answer that “philosophers from Aristotle to Kant 
have recognized that a certain vagueness in ethics is unavoidable” (135). 
The test of ethical plausibility then seems to be whether or not one “can 
imagine a conjunction of divine perfection [and a given moral command]” 
(136). Okay, then why posit that vagueness or imaginability here, rather 
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than at an earlier junction, like when engaging in moral reasoning prior to 
doing theology? Why not prefer a more pragmatic or phenomenological 
ethic and skip some of these problems that seem like a significant dis-
traction from getting down to the business of doing the good rather than 
disputing about the ontology of the good?
Perhaps the strongest answer to this question comes in chapter 8, one 
of their most solid and interesting chapters. There the authors go to bat 
against “unfriendly atheism,” i.e., the view that belief in God is not per-
missible because such belief is irrational. Baggett and Walls are not merely 
exploring a possible view about ethics; they are defending the right to 
believe. Or, as they put it in chapter 9, “The right ultimate view of reality 
is plausibly the one that will be most likely to produce the right analysis of 
the relationship between morality and rationality” (172). In other words, 
the right view of God will lead to a world that makes sense.
The authors hold that naturalism necessarily leads to determinism. On 
the one hand, I’m inclined to agree that this seems the likeliest possibility, 
but I also note that many naturalists insist that it simply ain’t so. Some nat-
uralists, like Peirce and Bergson, suggest that the conditions of spiritual 
freedom might arise out of nature. But I think that Baggett and Walls have 
in mind in particular naturalists like Dennett, whose case for an emergent 
freedom often seems to amount to something like a case for merely ap-
parent freedom. That case boils down to a wallpapered version of Crick’s 
“astonishing hypothesis,” in which we are all “just a pack of neurons” 
whose function is to invent clever little words like “freedom” and then 
to act like we believe these clever little words. If, as I think, Baggett and 
Walls are really concerned with these latter sorts of naturalists, then not 
only do Baggett and Walls appear to be right, but it becomes clear that 
their concern in this book is not merely epistemic. What’s really at stake 
here is nothing short of everything. As they point out in chapter 4, “If God 
exists, he’s not just one more item in the inventory of reality, but the key to 
understanding the whole” (80).
And this is one of the great strengths of the book. It is not merely a 
book about the theory of ethics. It’s really a book about everything, and 
its authors seem motivated by the idea that everything in fact matters. As 
a pragmatist, I can’t say that I can prove them right, but I can say that I 
prefer the consequences of their belief to many of its alternatives.
Despite my appreciation for their position, I am not convinced they are 
completely fair to some of their philosophical opponents. In the first chap-
ter, for instance, they critique a straw man who bears a lot of resemblance 
to Sartre, but not enough to be convincing. While it is true that Sartre is 
deeply skeptical about finding transcendent “values or commands to 
legitimize our conduct,” that does not leave him in the position of 
endorsing all conduct whatsoever, nor does it leave the Sartrean in the 
position of the immoralist. Sartre’s critique of transcendence is not simply 
aimed at undermining ethics but at underscoring human moral freedom 
and moral responsibility, and at drawing attention to the importance of 
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intersubjectivity (and so of the people we encounter) over against the 
potentially idolatrous worship of moral abstractions. Abstractions can be-
come fierce gods, and they sometimes demand human sacrifice. In this 
and later chapters, their construals of the positions of Plato and Ockham 
are similarly subject to criticism. Still, I think we can cut Baggett and Walls 
a good deal of slack. They are not arguing against Ockham the man, but 
against a view they have identified as Ockhamism, and if they have failed 
to include in this criticism all possible versions of Ockhamism, their criti-
cisms of this version are keen and instructive. The same goes for their pre-
sentation of the Euthyphro problem. Those of us who spend our lives in 
Plato’s texts might not recognize their explanation of the problem from the 
eponymous dialogue, but we can nevertheless look at the problem they do 
address with admiration of their philosophical insight and rigor. To their 
credit, they make a small nod in the direction of Sartrean intersubjectivity 
in chapter 5 when putting (a little) distance between themselves and the 
moral arguments of William Lane Craig (100).
This book has a clear aim, and a clear trajectory, and watching Baggett 
and Walls follow that trajectory is instructive and rewarding. While I am 
not certain that they succeed in making their argument as simple or as ac-
cessible as they had hoped, the book has the great strength of giving us a 
fresh and serious look at a topic that might matter more than anything else.
The Poetics of Evil: Towards an Aesthetic Theodicy, by Philip Tallon. Oxford 
University Press, 2012. xx + 251 pages. $74.00 (hardcover).
DAVID BROWN, The Divinity School, University of St. Andrews
As the title of his book indicates, Tallon seeks to restore an aesthetic di-
mension in Christian approaches to the problem of evil. However, rather 
than placing them alongside moral considerations where the aesthetic 
inevitably comes a poor second, he suggests that it be thought more in 
terms of Eleonore Stump’s second person perspective, insights that can 
enrich the believing Christian’s understanding of the nature of the divine 
creation. To that end, Tallon’s discussion proceeds by three stages, taking 
in turn the traditional harmony argument (with good balancing evil) and 
then the issue of tragedy before turning finally to more recent discussions 
of “horrors.”
Tallon’s interest in the first issue appears to have taken its rise from dis-
satisfaction with Barth’s familiar remark that the music of Mozart enabled 
him to hear “the whole context of providence.” The balance of light and 
shade emerges, Tallon suggests, much more clearly in many another com-
poser, and indeed Irenaeus’s more dynamic, symphonic understanding is 
better than Augustine’s essentially static picture. Yet it is Augustine who 
is defended at length from a number of critiques, including the claim of 
